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Executive Summary 
•  There is a clear role for behavioural identifiers 
to sit alongside existing identity systems and 
provide new lines of data that can be used 
for verification.
•  Behavioural identifiers can help provide a more 
prominent focus on person centred engagement 
as part of an approach to developing digital 
identity systems based on societal norms and 
expectations.
•  The 1.5 billion people without legal identity 
cannot be viewed as a homogeneous group. It is 
imperative to distinguish between the different 
groups that exist (i.e. refugees, migrants, rural 
communities) and design systems for and with 
them, ensuring there is a role for users within the 
governance of these systems.
•  We need a clearer understanding of how key 
legal frameworks at international, regional 
may evolve in relation to new technologies. 
Furthermore, whilst we know that international 
standards, norms and agreements can play a 
crucial role within the digital identity landscape, 
we need to better understand their influence 
at a domestic level.
•  Corporate organisations continue to play an 
important role in both driving and restraining 
innovation in this sector. We need to invest  
in effective partnership work and the 
development of interoperability standards.  
We need a better understanding of the role 
of effective regulation and how to harness 
innovation for identity systems.
•  Finally, the technologies that support digital 
identity systems are evolving rapidly. Adoption 
of these technologies are fluid and complex. Both 
private and public actors require intelligence in 
order to anticipate how digital infrastructure 
might evolve in the next five to ten years. Failure 
to do so, may lead to ineffective of identity 
systems which may prove costly for both social 
and economic aims.
Key Findings
The provision of legal identity for all is increasingly viewed as 
a key mechanism for driving development goals. Behavioural 
attributes produced through digital interactions may have 
significant potential for enabling access to a legal identity for 
all, however the social, legal, and technical affordances and 
implications remain under-explored.
In the developing world investment in identity systems is 
growing exponentially, however successfully implemented 
systems may still fail to address the needs of the most 
marginalised in society, and in some instances further 
marginalise vulnerable communities, destroying informal 
economies of exchange and support whilst simultaneously 
excluding them from the newly developed formal 
mechanisms based on more robust identity systems.
This report brings together leading researchers across 
the legal and social sciences, alongside technical and 
commercial specialists to explore the challenges and the 
opportunities for the digital collection of behavioural 
attributes for new and emerging digital identity systems. 
We provide a unique and wide view to the problem area, 
and unpack the role of behavioural attributes within the 
existing legal, social and technical landscape. 
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About this report
On the 8 February 2017, University of Exeter and 
Coelition with funding from the UK Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC) convened a 
workshop entitled Building Digital Identities. The 
workshop aimed to bring together and mobilise 
leading researchers across the legal and social sciences, 
alongside technical and commercial specialists to 
explore the challenges and the opportunities for the 
digital collection of behavioural attributes for new 
digital identity systems. This cross-sector and  
cross-disciplinary approach has brought a unique  
and wide view to the problem area.
The report draws on the discussions and themes arising 
from the workshop, alongside existing research to scope 
and anticipate key priorities for research and action. 
After an introduction the report is structured around 
three key sections:
1.  Dynamics of legal identity: What is legal identity? 
What legal frameworks exist both nationally and 
internationally to define identity? How might these 
enable or constrain the use of behavioural attributes 
for identity provision?
2.  Implementation environment: What are the 
conditions required for successful implementation of 
identity systems? What are the different roles that 
public or private sectors can play? How might we 
learn from failure?
3.  Infrastructures, scientific and technological 
innovations: How are behavioural attributes being 
used to verify identity? What are the key frameworks 
required to ensure privacy, dignity and trust? What 
are the key scientific innovations?
Based on findings from the workshop and 
supplementary review of the literature we propose  
five key areas for further research and action.
• Person-centred design 
• Legal and regulatory frameworks 
• Public, private and person partnerships 
• Social and ethical considerations 
• Technology and innovation
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Identities change with context and life stage, 
resulting in a range of personas and profiles that we 
actively manage. This composite identity creates and 
defines our role in society. In our interactions with 
society we are often required to verify who we are, 
and this is done in three main ways:
•  Firstly, the most common mechanism is through 
verifying facts about who we are, such as date and 
place of birth, gender, where we live and work;
•  Secondly through distinguishing biological features 
including how we look, such as eye colour, hair, face, 
fingerprints and other biometric data such as DNA; 
and
•  Finally, through the social and economic context 
of how we live and who we live with, for example 
where we have been, significant life events and 
daily routines. These form the basis for identity in 
everyday life. These are often the records that are 
captured within digital environments and include for 
example: browsing the web, making and receiving 
phone calls, making and receiving payments, 
borrowing a book, using a gym, buying a product or 
service, paying a subscription, attending an event etc.
Identity is the basis for autonomy and self-
determination (Mas and Porteous, 2015); the capacity 
to verify one’s identity is therefore of vital importance 
for accessing rights, benefits and services be these 
financial, health related or educational (ID4D, 2016; 
Gelb and Clark, 2013). However whilst some people 
may own multiple passports, addresses and have various 
means to identify aspects of themselves, others may be 
undocumented, which may in turn entail being denied 
opportunities and possibilities to exercise civil and 
social rights.
For example, in Kenya as in many countries,  
identity cards are required to receive hospital care,  
to attend university, to vote, to marry, to obtain a 
passport and many other basic services (Oppenheim  
and Powell, 2015).
Identity provision is increasingly advocated for 
as a public good and linked to human rights and 
development agendas (Atick et al, 2016; World Bank 
Group/GSMA, 2016). The inclusion of legal identity  
for all by 2030 in the UN Sustainable Development 
Goal (SDG) 16.9, is one example of how this is being 
put into practice.
Introduction
Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for 
sustainable development, provide access to 
justice for all and build effective, accountable 
and inclusive institutions at all levels
Target 16.9: By 2030, provide legal identity  
for all, including birth registration
Indicator: Proportion of children under 5 years 
of age whose births have been registered with 
a civil authority, by age
UN Sustainable  
Development Goal 16
UN SDG 16.9
A universal aspect of every human being is that we 
each have a distinct and unique identity. Our internal 
experience of identity and the expression of this identity 
are both multifaceted. 
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The benefits of identity systems for national 
development have also been documented. Szreter (2006) 
argues that identity registration in 16th Century 
England was a factor in enabling that country to 
advance more rapidly than others through its ability to 
empower citizens and communities. Despite the benefits 
to individuals, communities, and states, there are 
currently an estimated 1.5 billion people living without 
the means to verify who they are (ID4D, 2016).
The discussions at the workshop and subsequent desk 
research uncovered very little intelligence (beyond case 
studies) about who these 1.5 billion people are, although 
localised detailed studies exist (Harbitz, 2009). It is 
evident from the case studies that this will not be a 
homogeneous group and that different cultural contexts, 
gender, histories, political and social contexts will 
influence not only behaviour, but also agency, dignity 
and vulnerability in relation to identity provision 
(Oppenheim and Powell, 2015, Caribou Digital, 
forthcoming). The World Bank Group suggests that 
children and women from poor rural areas in Africa and 
Asia make up the majority of this group (WBG/GSMA, 
2016). A recent report by the newly established ID2020 
agency goes further to provide illustrative examples 
including children and young people in Malawi, 
refugees who cannot receive or request authentication 
from their governments, people stripped of their 
identity documents as a result of human trafficking 
(ID2020, 2017). The examples work well to show not 
only the diversity of the people without identity, but also 
the range of contexts and implications.
Identity provision is also associated with risks and 
social harms, which need to be better understood. 
Research has shown that the benefits of legal identity 
are uneven; indeed some individuals and groups have 
been negatively affected by gaining a legal identity 
(Arora, 2016; Gelb and Clark, 2013; ID2020, 2017; 
Oppenheim and Powell, 2015; Caribou Digital, 
forthcoming).
For populations whose lawful status entitles them to 
financial, social and political participation it follows that 
verifiable identity will provide greater access to social 
and educational resources, however, many groups face 
discriminatory practices and exclusion based on their 
identity. The Rwandese Genocide in 1994 in which an 
estimated 800,000 were killed on the basis of their identity 
is one extreme example (Prevent Genocide International, 
2015). However, other examples exist, in Malawi, it is 
estimated that 20-60% of individuals receiving free health 
services are not Malawian (ID2020, 2017).
Whilst a more effective identity system may help 
target health care provision for nationals and legal 
residents and lift the current strain on the system - the 
number of people needing health care will not decline. 
Undoubtedly some people will stand to benefit, others 
will lose. The provision of legal identity systems can 
also create new barriers and challenges to inclusion. For 
example, the use of fingerprinting in biometric identity 
systems may not be accessible to all excluding elderly, 
infants or labourers if suitable alternative routes are not 
in place (Gelb and Clark, 2013). For those that do get 
enrolled in biometric and other types of registration 
systems, the history of these technologies demonstrates 
that their use is associated with both benefits to 
individuals as well as an increased ability of the state to 
control populations and restrict autonomy and freedom 
(Breckenridge, 2014).
Finally, the use of identity systems may destroy 
informal economies, where individuals habitually 
resident in a country were generally assumed to be 
citizens, the introduction of identity cards meant that 
those without documentation were more frequently 
treated as, non-citizens (Brewer et al. 2015). How legal 
identity is defined is also crucial here. The current 
measure for SDG 16.9 is birth registration, yet studies 
have shown that in many countries this is not the core 
document needed to establish citizenship and access 
services (Oppenheim and Powell, 2015, ITU-T, 2016), 
whilst it has also been shown that the link between 
birth registration and outcomes associated with 
development and political participation varies widely 
across countries (Oppenheim and Powell, 2015).
Introduction
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In the developing world, biometric technologies have 
become increasingly prevalent (Breckenridge, 2014) 
fuelled by an alliance of states, intergovernmental 
organisations and transnational corporations – 
what Lyon and Topak (2013, 28) referred to as the 
“oligopolies of the means of official identification”. 
Gelb & Clark (2013) found that the industry grew at 34 
percent annually between 2005 and 2010. These new 
innovations are rapidly opening new possibilities for 
governments to develop comprehensive systems that 
have the potential to reduce costs and human error as 
well as increase administrative efficiency (World Bank 
Group, 2016 ITU-T, 2016). However these approaches 
to identity registration, largely based on biometric 
and verifiable facts, are costly and require a level of 
infrastructural support not available in many settings.
As of yet the potential of using digital behavioural 
attributes, (i.e. how we live and who we live with, daily 
routines) for verifying legal identity is not currently 
realised. Across the world, digital technologies are 
becoming increasingly integrated into our daily lives. 
Through many of our basic interactions, such as using a 
phone to talk or send SMS messages we are interacting 
with a connected infrastructure. We now frequently talk 
to and share news with peers and professionals through 
social networks, we access financial and social services, 
we purchase and consume a wide variety of media and 
products, and we measure and record aspects of our 
lives for example through health related apps. This use 
of digital technologies and associated infrastructures 
is producing personal data on an unprecedented scale; 
whilst this data has traditionally been conceptualized as 
a by-product of system functions – e.g. ‘digital exhaust’ 
– it is becoming an increasingly significant aspect of 
value generation in digital platforms, and therefore a 
core motivation for their development (Zuboff, 2016). 
Our interactions in the digital world, alongside an 
increasingly sophisticated set of tools to analyse 
personal behavioural data, are beginning to tell a story 
about us, about who we are, what we do, what we believe 
and value. They effectively work towards building a 
stratified layer or history of identity evidence that can 
be used for verification.
In countries with a comprehensive digital 
infrastructure, these attributes tend to sit alongside 
existing identifiers (e.g. home address, phone number, 
date of birth) to improve security and convenience. 
However, in developing countries, traditional identifiers 
may not be as widely available: births are not all 
registered, the location of home may be transient or 
unofficial and access to communications technology 
might be on a community rather than on an individual 
basis. In this context, behavioural attributes captured 
with digital technologies may play a profound role. 
They have the potential to provide new lines of data that 
may enable individuals to assert their identity in new 
ways. While some parts of the world remain digitally 
excluded, access to and use of digital technology is 
starting to increase in many less-developed countries. 
The rapid, recent expansion of mobile networks around 
the world is linking rural, remote, and low-resource 
settings with more urban and developed parts of the 
world. As usage rates grow in these settings and across 
the social spectrum, mobile phones in particular may be 
a particularly valuable platform for producing personal 
behavioural data for use in digital identity systems.
However, significant gaps remain in our knowledge 
about the potential of behavioural data for identity 
systems. Care must also be taken to minimize the 
negative impacts to individuals and wider society that 
identity systems can sometimes engender. Moreover, 
serious social harms are increasingly being documented 
in behavioural data mining and personal data analytics 
more broadly (Barocas and Selbst, 2016; Boyd and 
Crawford, 2012; Pasquale, 2015; Zuboff, 2015). 
Notably, the concentration of power in the hands of 
the corporate digital platforms in which behavioural 
data are produced and controlled – e.g. Google and 
Facebook – and their connections to governmental 
surveillance, security, and intelligence operations (Lyon 
2014; Ball & Snider, 2013; Murakami Wood, 2013) 
should be of concern to any efforts designed to leverage 
personal data to demonstrate identity. This report thus 
approaches the issue cautiously, towards a more detailed 
understanding of the opportunities and risks of building 
digital identities based on behavioural attributes.
Introduction
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1.  Legal Identity
A key outcome from our discussions 
at the workshop was to note the need 
of clearer definitions and measures 
for legal identity and in particular its 
relationship to a person’s citizenship, to 
registration and to identity documents.
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One definition for legal identity put forward by 
UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP and Plan International 
was ‘the recognition of a person’s existence before 
the law, facilitating the realisation of specific rights 
and corresponding duties’ (Lopez et al., 2014). This 
interpretation places legal identity firmly within human 
rights law where it is conceived as a status, that of being 
human. In human rights law, everyone has the right 
to be recognised as a person before the law (article 6, 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights -UDHR; article 
16, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
-ICCPR) and with this comes the right to be equality 
treated before the law (article 7 UDHR; article 26, 
ICCPR) and the principle of dignity. Perhaps the most 
widely used and referenced international instrument 
is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
states that all human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights (article 1, UDHR) without distinction 
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status (article 2, UDHR). It 
goes on to say that ‘no distinction shall be made on 
the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international 
status of the country or territory to which a person 
belongs’ (article 2, UDHR).
Human rights law seeks to identify the humanity that 
we each have. Marshall (2014) argues that human 
dignity is a central characteristic of our identity in 
human rights law, as when a human being acts in a way 
that harms human dignity it is said to be inhuman.  
She points to our unique capacity as human beings to 
reflect on our existence and the existence of others, 
to perceive injustice, to pursue cooperation and to act 
in ways that are responsible and give expression to 
ethical principles (Marshall, 2014). Although there is 
no common judicial interpretation of human dignity, 
McCrudden (2008) identifies three elements, which are 
helpful for our framing. The first is that human beings 
possess an intrinsic worth, merely by being human;  
the second is that this intrinsic worth should be 
recognised and respected by others and the third 
concerns the relationship between the individual and 
the state, in that the state exists to serve the intrinsic 
value of the individual and not the other way around 
(Marshall, 2014).
Whereas human rights law is concerned largely with 
the relationship between the state and individuals, the 
past fifty years of development has seen the emergence 
of supra-national bodies, the European Union being 
amongst the most well-known examples, whereby 
elements of state sovereignty in ceded to the larger 
body. Examples in the identity space include the recent 
EU framework for identity management (Milieu 
Limited, 2016). Furthermore, there is a growing role for 
non-state actors including International organisations 
(i.e. United Nations) and large commercial corporations 
(i.e. Google, Apple, Amazon, Facebook). Whilst these 
actors do not have the authority to produce hard laws, 
they have the capacities to play a role in producing 
norms, and wield a significant amount of influence in 
generating, navigating and upholding guiding principles 
with regards to identity verification and provision. For 
example, in one ongoing case the Pakistani government 
has requested Facebook’s assistance in implementing 
the state’s law with regards to blasphemy. The details 
of the request are not clear; however, it has been widely 
reported that it may include help from Facebook in 
identifying individuals who post content, alongside 
censorship (BBC, 2017; Hashim, 2017).
1. Legal Identity
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Increasingly and certainly with the provision of identity 
cards, recognition of our humanity is obtained through 
acts of registration and verification by the state. Rights 
are granted, distributed or withheld depending on 
credentials and ability to prove them. This perspective 
is adopted within the definitions used by the Inter-
American Development Bank and other agencies, where 
legal identity is a ‘legal civil status obtained through 
birth registration and civil identification that recognises 
the individual as a subject of law and protection of the 
state” (Harbitz and Molina, 2010). Costas Douzinas 
(2007, p.54) observes the challenge in human rights is 
the ‘ongoing and always failing struggle to close the 
gap between the abstract man and the concrete citizen’; 
closing this gap involves adding ‘flesh, blood and sex 
to the pale outline of the human’ (Marshall, 2014). The 
aim of SDG 16.9 could be construed to help close this 
gap, to ease the barriers through which all citizens can 
access the benefits of full legal personhood as defined 
by the ability to have one’s existence verified and proven 
by the state through the registration, documentation 
and verification of name, personal data, date of birth 
and a unique identifier. It is important therefore to 
acknowledge that SDG 16.9 is seeking the universal 
provision of verifiable legal identity. The key indicator 
for this goal is the registration of birth. This model 
of identification is laid out below. However as we will 
explore further in this report, this model is designed 
for ‘hard identity’ where any interaction or relationship 
begins with a strong identification event (i.e. the 
provision of birth certificate). Increasingly, identity 
interactions use the softer models where assurance 
is build using a combination of factors alongside an 
assertion of sameness over time.
1. Legal Identity
(Gelb and Clark, 2013)
Identity
Unique 
identifier
Official 
identity
Authentication/ 
verification
Identification/
registration
Identity 
document (ID) 
[Optional]
Building Digital Identities June 2017 12
World Bank Group/GSMA (2016) identify four 
components of the assurance process. What a person is 
(i.e. age, gender, finger prints etc.), what a person knows 
(i.e. passwords, pin etc.), what a person has (i.e. smart 
card, mobile phone, identity documents etc.) and what 
a person does (i.e. handwriting, keystrokes, application 
use). These broader models bring into play one further 
area of law, that is the right to a personal identity and 
personality, which can evolve over time. In law these 
largely emanate from rights to privacy or respect for 
one’s private life found in human rights law (Marshall, 
2014, article 8, ECHR, 1950). Hamilton (2008) argues 
that the persona and person are ‘mutually constitutive 
and reinforcing aspects of identity’ and Marshall (2014) 
notes that the persona is a ‘socially active, culturally 
produced trace of the person; a copy of the person’. 
According to the European Court of Human Rights, the 
right to identity is largely derived from the right to a 
private life (see notably Pretty v UK, 25 April 2002).
A key principle provided within the right to respect of 
one’s private life, which is especially pertinent for our 
discussion, is the commitment to facilitate and maintain 
conditions for individuation and the realisation of the 
self over time. David Feldman (1994) argues that these 
privacy rights, have evolved in response to the nature 
of social life. They give us control over the boundaries 
of our existence and relations with others. They 
provide a sense of recognition of the interlocking social 
spheres in which we have different responsibilities and 
relationships with varying degrees of intimacy. As we 
explore later in this report, the right to a private life 
(including personal and social aspects) at home, with 
family or in correspondence, alongside the ability for an 
individual to have control over what they share about 
their identity is fundamental to their well-being and to 
protecting the core dignity of being human.
Whilst provision of legal identity most commonly 
comes into contact with international human rights 
law, there are other national and regional laws which 
may need considering depending on the context. For 
example, in the case of the UK Identity project other 
laws of relevance include Disability Discrimination 
Act, Race Relations Act and Data Protection Act 
(Davies, S et al 2005) and at the time EU Law (Milieu 
Limited, 2016). In more advanced economies we will 
often find more intricate and established frameworks 
at both national and regional levels. However, in 
emergent economies these frameworks may be less 
well established, particularly at a regional level, but 
potentially also at national levels.
We have set out above a brief outline of some of the 
key legal frameworks, predominantly enshrined within 
international human rights law. In the discussion, 
we highlighted a distinction between identity (as an 
inalienable human right), identity verification (as a 
mechanism to enable the distribution or denial of 
those rights), and personal autonomy (as the capacity 
to exercise control over what you share of your 
identity). These distinctions and the need for clear 
definitions around them were a prominent feature of 
the discussions at the workshop. Whilst our outline 
here is predominantly located within international law, 
it is evident that a detailed understanding is required 
at country level, in relation to the intersection between 
international human rights law, regional and national 
law, including the legal frameworks on data protection 
and privacy laws.
Strong identity practices and identity definitions based 
on historical documents present a self-evident contrast 
to the everyday identity of an individual living within 
a community. Technology is increasingly creating new 
sources of information, many of them behavioural that 
may start to bridge this gap. Commercial organisations 
have shown that they can successfully deliver services 
on a global basis using these behavioural attributes with 
an acceptable level of identity assurance. The use and 
adoption of behavioural data for the provision of legal 
identity adds both opportunity and further complexity 
to the landscape identified above.
1. Legal Identity
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2.  Implementation 
Environment
In recent years, there have been 
many failed identity projects struggling 
with escalating costs, integration 
and user adoption being just some 
of the common challenges. Whilst 
behavioural attributes have the 
potential to provide new lines of data 
for identity systems, lessons around 
implementation of biometric systems 
must be learnt.
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Developing countries have shown increasing activity in 
creating national identity systems. Many of the National 
Identity systems reviewed are utilising biometric data 
(ITU-T, 2016) a rapidly growing industry within the 
developing world. Gelb & Clark (2013) found that 
the biometrics industry grew at 28 percent annually 
between 2005 and 2010 and that the rate was even 
higher in developing regions, at 34 percent.
The drivers for implementing such systems include 
meeting development agendas, a need for greater 
efficiency in administration, and compliance regulation 
for example, Know your Customer (Makin, 2017). Such 
programmes are often lauded for their capacity to 
promote inclusion and equality. The World Bank (2017) 
points to four case studies in Thailand, Peru, Pakistan 
and India claiming that ‘strong identification systems 
can lead countries to become more economically 
prosperous and secure, operate more effectively and 
efficiently, protect human rights, and deliver benefits 
to people’. However, frequently, where there is evidence 
of positive impacts of identity systems such as in the 
case of Aadhaar, we know that these systems are not a 
panacea. One study conducted in 2003 on e-government 
schemes, suggests that failure rates in implementation 
are high and costly. It estimated that 35% of schemes 
were a total failure, and a further 50% a partial failure 
(Heeks, 2003). However, other studies provide higher 
success rates. Of the 48 systems which were reviewed by 
ITU-T (2016) found that 35 were operational and in use, 
and only 3 systems had stalled. Where implementation 
has taken place, studies have shown that identity 
systems may be increasingly restrictive for marginalized 
communities, making it more difficult for individuals 
to gain access to legal documentations (Oppenheim and 
Powell, 2015). In other cases, states may make access to 
key services contingent on documentation, destroying 
existing informal networks of support (Caribou Digital, 
forthcoming; Brewer et al, 2015).
The potential of behavioural attributes to enable 
individuals to assert and verify their identity is largely 
unexplored within the developing world, however there 
is much to learn from the successes and failures of the 
national identity systems which are emerging world-
wide (CESG, 2014). In this workshop, we received two 
contributions reflecting on national identity systems 
in the UK (UK Identity Cards Bill and Gov.uk) and in 
India (Aadhaar and other systems). These contributions 
led to discussions which we have broadly come to 
understand to be concerned with the implementation 
of identity systems and the conditions needed for 
successful implementation. Two wide-ranging themes 
emerged from discussions, explored further below.
2.  Implementation 
Environment
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2.1  Person centred design, governance  
and implementation
The benefits of digital identity systems are frequently 
framed around six key areas: (i) financial inclusion, 
(ii) gender equality, (iii) access to health and education 
services, (iv) social protection and safety, (v) improved 
governance and (vi) greater efficiency (ID4D, 2016; 
World Bank Group and Centre for Global Development, 
2017; Atick et al, 2016). Within these broad areas, it is 
easy to lose sight of the actual experiences of people 
using these systems. How on a micro scale do these 
technologies both enable and constrain behaviour? 
How do they impact vulnerability, resilience, agency 
and dignity? And how might this differ for different 
contexts, different identities and different relational 
dynamics? These are all questions that emerged 
throughout the workshop. We highlighted that 
there is not a single heterogeneous group of people 
without access to a formal identity and that human 
beings belong to multiple social groups. Similarly, 
we emphasised that dimensions such as vulnerability, 
resilience, and agency are not fixed. Instead, they are 
highly relational and dynamic, changing according to 
situations and contexts and to the interplay between key 
identity elements such as gender, ethnicity, disability 
etc. in any given moment. Accordingly, the concept of 
‘composite vulnerability’ can define for example, these 
multiple layers of situational vulnerability (Beduschi, 
forthcoming). In developing identity systems there is 
clearly a role for cross-discipline, cross-organisational 
collaboration in order to work within robust ethical 
frameworks. In particular scientists and engineers who 
develop technologies should work more closely with 
researchers who are specialists in law and the social 
consequences of technologies (Dijstelbloem, 2017).
Studies have shown that the provision of legal identity 
through identity systems may have significant 
negative consequences for already marginalised 
communities. Examples cited in the literature include 
how the transition to more formal identity systems 
may destabilise existing informal ecologies of social 
support. For example, Barrios (2015) notes that prior to 
implementation of identity cards, individuals habitually 
resident in a country were generally assumed to be 
citizens, even in the absence of official documentation. 
However, the introduction of these cards alongside 
the requirements to present them to obtain services, 
has shifted these assumptions. Individuals without 
documentation of identity are now often treated as, if 
not assumed to be, non-citizens (Barrios, 2015). Other 
studies are showing that they may affect people’s 
ability to exercise privacy over who they are, for 
example, one study has highlighted how women who 
had previously been saving secretly were forced into 
opening bank accounts in India and were therefore at 
greater risk of exposing their savings to spouses and 
family members who had power over them (Caribou 
Digital, forthcoming). Identity systems have also 
been shown to lead to increases in discriminatory 
treatment in the documentation process (Oppenheim 
and Powell, 2015; Brewer et al, 2015). Furthermore, 
the challenges that some groups face is that of a 
temporary loss of identification, for example in the 
case of refugees or migrants, many may have lost their 
identity documents in transit or had it stolen (ID2020, 
2017). As discussed in the introduction behavioural 
data mining and personal data analytics are leading to 
new forms of social harm. These include for example 
the increasing technological powers of governments to 
track individuals, alongside a reduction in the ability of 
people to lie about who they are, or hide their identity – 
a crucial capacity in order to protect against prevalent 
systemic abuse (Barocas and Selbst, 2016; Boyd and 
Crawford, 2012; Pasquale, 2015; Zuboff, 2015). We are 
also seeing political manipulation and collusion on 
an unprecedented scale via large corporate platforms 
such as Google and Facebook, who play a role in both 
governmental surveillance and security alongside 
intelligence gathering and crowd manipulation (Lyon 
2014; Ball & Snider, 2013; Murakami Wood, 2013).
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The recent publication from the World Bank Group 
and Centre for Global Development makes it clear that 
individuals ‘are at the centre of identification systems 
and have the right to know and exercise appropriate 
control over how their data is collected, used, stored, 
and shared’ (World Bank Group and Centre for  
Global Development, 2017). The document spotlights 
inclusion as one of the ten key principles  
of identification, it states that:
“ Legal, procedural, and social barriers to enrol in and 
use identification systems should be identified and 
mitigated, with special attention to poor people and 
groups who may be at risk of exclusion for cultural, 
political or other reasons (such as women, children, 
rural populations, ethnic minorities, linguistic and 
religious groups, migrants, the forcibly displaced,  
and stateless persons). Furthermore, identification 
systems and identity data should not be used as a 
tool for discrimination or infringe on individual or 
collective rights”.
World Bank Group and Centre for  
Global Development, 2017
One clear way to achieve these aims is through active 
user engagement with design, implementation and 
governance of systems (a person-centric approach). Its 
notable that whilst the benefits of user engagement are 
well documented across a wide range of fields we know 
surprisingly very little about effective user involvement 
within the digital identity space. Though there is 
much to learn from other initiatives and development 
agendas, specific knowledge about the techniques 
that are required to help improve accountability and 
transparency, develop trust, increase the relevance of 
systems and enable responsiveness towards differing 
contexts in the digital identity space is needed. The key 
policy instruments driving the agenda, in particular 
the Ten Principles on Identification for Sustainable 
Development (World Bank Group and Centre for 
Global Development, 2017) are advocating for user 
engagement, however we argued that it should be cited 
as central pillar of the principles of inclusion, design and 
governance within this publication.
2.2 Implementation
Demand led or top down?
Whilst the majority of developing countries now have 
some form of digital identity system, the contexts for 
implementation and the way in which projects have been 
implemented vary significantly across regions (ITU-T, 
2016, Gelb and Clark, 2013). Gelb and Clark (2013) 
describe two main evolution pathways, ‘demand led’ and 
‘top-down’. Demand-led services, such as was the case 
with Ghana’s E-zwich system, evolve from meeting a 
demand for a specific function (in this case transferring 
payments) and then expand to a much wider range of 
services including identity documentation for those 
on public payroll (Gelb and Clark, 2013). Several of 
the examples, begin with innovations in the electoral 
system, for example DRC biometric registration for the 
2005 elections is now the country’s primary identity 
system. The demand-led approach can be attractive 
for lower-income countries particularly, given the cost, 
resource and infrastructure considerations. They enable 
innovations to start small and scale up incrementally, 
often building on the needs of users (Gelb and Clark, 
2013). However, the demand-led approach can suffer 
from an inability to achieve economies of scale. There 
can be issues with the quality of data, security and 
privacy laws, likewise there is also higher-risk of 
building a patch-work system consisting of incompatible 
modules (Gelb and Clark, 2013). In contrast ‘top down’ 
approaches begin with the development of national 
identity systems which can then be used as a foundation 
for more specific applications and services. Examples 
abound in Latin America, but also exist in Malaysia 
and Pakistan and Europe (Gelb and Clark, 2013). The 
linkage between identity and service is often a staged 
process and the challenges of such approach include 
higher initial costs, slower development returns and 
possibly less active take up, more coordination and a 
requirement for long-term political support (Gelb and 
Clark, 2013).
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Commercial innovation
Private companies play a crucial role in the identity 
provision space, through innovation, development 
or supply. Providers may develop and supply both 
hardware and software, or identity services such as 
enrolment and authentication. Commercial service 
providers also act as identity providers. For example, 
subscriber identity module (SIM) cards and bank cards 
are both a form of identity documentation, and are 
often linked to identifiers provided by the state. Private 
firms are reliant on digital identity systems in order to 
provide services and enable transactions, including for 
example through banking, online commerce, mobile 
network operations (World Bank Group and Centre for 
Global Development, 2017; World Bank Group/GMSA 
(2016). Some of the largest corporate organisations 
(Google, Facebook, Apple, Amazon etc.) are basing their 
business models on the capacity to know an individual 
customer and to predict their attitudes, needs and 
wants. However, this capacity remains largely untapped 
for the provision of social good. In a recent study of 
innovation in emerging markets, Caribou Digital 
(2016) found that relatively few firms were building 
identity management solutions, though there have been 
considerable developments in components of these 
solutions (i.e. biometrics, algorithmic analyses, and 
distributed ledgers).
They note that the innovation is largely concentrated in 
the US and UK with very little innovation in emerging 
markets, citing unproven business, significantly lower 
levels of digital inclusion and disposable income as 
key barriers (Caribou Digital, 2016). A key underlying 
issue behind this disjunction is the lack of investment in 
creating interoperable frameworks under which private 
companies can operate. Due to the rapid growth of these 
large digital industries such as Facebook we have seen 
the emergence of new norms, with these organisations 
developing standards in accordance to their own 
frameworks and priorities.
While the role of private business in the development 
of technology is easily recognised, other commercial 
organisations are now using this technology with 
existing brands to develop personalised services. These 
services can build a relationship with a consumer with 
digital interactions that allow identity to evolve in more 
natural fashion. This ‘soft’ identity approach allows 
individuals to control privacy with multiple profiles 
until a transaction (e.g. digital payment) requires a 
‘harder’ identity to be used. In these systems, the 
history of behavioural data (defined by an assertion of 
sameness) forms the basis of both the identity 
assurance / verification and the valuable personalisation 
of the underlying service. This type of approach has 
benefits of data richness for the organisation and 
convenience for the individual, however the downstream 
impacts on privacy need to be monitored carefully.
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There is clear common-ground for collaboration 
between governments and private companies in order 
to increase the capacity of both private and public 
sectors to provide efficient services to individuals, be 
they potential consumers or citizens. However, the 
roles that are played will depend on the implementation 
environment. Countries with more developed identity 
systems can enable private companies to utilise a 
minimum set of attributes which can be can be used for 
identification, authentication, and authorisation. Where 
this data is not available private companies may play 
a role in supporting the government in the provision 
of legal identity. For example, in Uganda mobile 
technology is used to enable birth registration in remote 
villages (World Bank Group/GMSA, 2016).
Whilst regulatory change can play a key role in 
fostering innovation, it can often do so without a clear 
sense of the purpose of the innovation from a user 
perspective (Caribou Digital, 2016). Identity solutions 
need a clear rationale and purpose underpinning 
how and why they might be adopted. To some extent 
state-led identity systems can make adoption a legal 
requirement (potentially leading to marginalisation 
and exclusion), successful private-sector systems are 
frequently more person-orientated.
However, Caribou Digital (2016) identified that at 
present a lack of scalable identity systems in the private-
sector, with many of the innovations growing out of 
highly localised niche conditions. Building on work 
by Caribou Digital (2016) we identified the following 
groups of industry players:
•  Enterprise identity solutions providers  
(e.g. Gemalto, Vasco, Morpho, Safran)
•  Identity providers  
(e.g. Facebook, Google, Apple, Twitter, Mydex,  
Yoti, ShoCard)
•  Identity verification providers  
(e.g. Experian, Group, Equifax, Call Credit)
•  Decentralized identity framework  
(e.g. Blockstack Labs, Open Mustard Seed)
•  Data aggregators  
(e.g. Acxiom)
•  Transactional providers  
(e.g. PayPal, mobile operators, transport providers)
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Fostering conditions for implementation
The place and fit of behavioural identity systems within 
the existing identity environment is important. There 
are two overlapping approaches worth considering. 
The first is the use of behavioural attributes alongside 
existing systems be they demand-led or top-down, the 
second is the use in contexts where neither traditional 
nor biometric identity systems have been successful in 
reaching the 1.5 billion people who do not currently 
have legal identity (such as women, children, rural 
populations, ethnic minorities, linguistic and religious 
groups, migrants, the forcibly displaced, and stateless 
persons). We explore the possibilities further in the 
following section.
Designing and implementing identity programmes on 
project by project basis, limits the potential of these 
systems to meet social goals, and can severely hamper 
progress (Gelb and Clark, 2013). ID4D (2016) identify four 
key enablers for successful implementation:
• Good governance and institutional capacity;
• Legal and regulatory frameworks;
•  Technology standards and interoperability frameworks;
• Public-Private partnerships.
These broad areas provide a helpful basis, although it is 
recognised that more research is needed into the failures 
of identity systems, whether these be partial or complete 
failures. Our discussions identified a set of considerations 
for successful implementation, which have been further 
developed following the workshop to align with the ITU-T 
review of 160 schemes where biometric identification has 
been used:
(i)   Existing geo-political conditions, such as the case 
of Afghanistan where the ongoing conflict and 
compressed timeframes have played a key role in 
hampering progress (ITU-T 2016).
(ii)  Existing technology infrastructure, for example in 
Bolivia and Somaliland where connectivity problems 
have meant that biometric technology had all but 
a cosmetic impact on existing identity systems; or 
Yemen where inadequate technology, (alongside) poor 
procurement and data management processes have 
hampered progress (ITU-T 2016).
(iii)  Fragmentation, for example in some instances such 
as Malawi where projects have been too small for 
savings to cover the cost of programmes, or different 
identity systems have been used for individual 
programmes thus failing to provide services in a 
client centred way. In one case, Nigeria there were 12 
ongoing identity card projects of which 8 called for 
biometrics (ITU-T 2016).
(iv)  Inclusive practices, for example, in the case 
of Aadhaar where the decoupling of formal 
identification from citizenship, may have helped 
with inclusion, but it may simply have shifted the 
documentation burden to later processes (ITU-T 
2016). The provision of alternative pathways 
through a system, such as when individuals cannot 
supply information (i.e. fingerprints), alongside 
clear performance standards is crucial to  
inclusive systems.
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(v)  Privacy, although conceptions of privacy differ 
from culture to culture, countries require a stable 
framework for data protection that covers the 
storage, linkage and use of data. 
 
Many developing countries do not have such a 
framework, and existing regulations in more 
developed settings are often inadequate to 
safeguard privacy rights in the rapidly evolving 
digital sphere. In the shorter-run, agreed 
protections on personal data within a project 
provide a short-term solution (ITU-T 2016).
(vi)  Costs, whilst costs are falling biometric 
identification is still seen as too costly. Often 
high-cost, proprietary packages are chosen instead 
of cheaper low-tech substitutes. However, costs 
must be considered holistically, for example in 
the absence of a functioning identification system, 
biometric or behavioural systems may be no costlier 
than paper-based alternatives, and may save 
greatly in the long run due to more automation 
and reduced fraud (ITU-T 2016). One further 
consideration would be to identity existing digital 
platforms that already collect personal behavioural 
data, which might then lower costs compared to 
developing standalone systems.
(vii)  Public opinion and trust, the formation of public 
opinion and trust on new technologies is not 
historically, culturally or geographically isolated, 
but linked to prior debate and experiences. Policy 
makers and relevant agencies need to lay the 
ground work for effective public support, failure to 
do so, could lead to non-compliance and boycott.
(viii)  Policy making, the technologies associated 
with tracking behavioural attributes are rapidly 
advancing and it is therefore crucial to foster 
the conditions whereby policy makers can make 
informed decisions, and feel able to manage the 
risks and uncertainties.
2.3 Summary
It has emerged from the workshop and subsequent 
research that the contexts in which digital identity 
systems are developed are highly complex and that 
there is no ‘off the shelf ’ single solution.
The studies show that good governance and 
institutional capacity, legal and regulatory frameworks, 
public and private partnerships all play a significant 
role, alongside clear user engagement and test cases. At 
present the largest digital platforms (Google, Facebook, 
Apple, Amazon etc.) are basing their business models 
on the capacity to know an individual customer and to 
predict their attitudes, needs and wants. This capacity is 
an untapped potential for social goods and particularly 
the provision of legal identity. Whilst some argue that 
the business models are unproven, the next phase of 
the identity landscape will need harness the capacity 
that is already out there in the private space as well as 
finding ways to incentivise innovation for development 
purposes. Identity defined and verified through 
behavioural attributes are inherently inclusive,  
low cost and emergent from existing technology 
infrastructure. Our challenge is to explore how they  
can be included in policy based on public opinion and 
new privacy practices.
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3.  Infrastructure, 
Science and 
Technology
As technologies evolve and  
become ubiquitous, they offer  
new opportunities in the  
developing world. 
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Participation in digital activities has traditionally been 
exclusionary due to the high cost of hardware and usage 
fees, or simply by the total absence of the necessary 
infrastructure in some settings. Developments in 
digital technology however, including inexpensive 
mobile devices, wireless networks, and cloud-based 
applications, are enabling an increasingly accessible 
digital sphere. We are seeing an unprecedented rise 
in the absolute numbers of people joining the global 
digital economy, enabling access to a broad range of 
financial, educational and social services. Mobile phones 
in particular present an opportunity for producing 
behavioural attributes for use in digital identity systems 
in many countries. These changes are not without 
negative consequences for those who cannot access the 
devices of digital infrastructure, as these communities 
are becoming increasingly marginalised.
Digital interactions point to who and where we are, 
whereas traditional forms (i.e. certificate of birth) and 
biometrics (i.e. fingerprints) work well to provide single 
strong identity authentication events, behavioural 
identifiers provide long term contextual evidence. 
These attributes are increasingly being explored as an 
additional component to identity resolution, particularly 
within the developed world where privacy is a primary 
concern, but will clearly play a role in developing world 
in the near future.
The construction of identity systems based on 
behaviour requires novel and systematic technical 
solutions that exploit and challenge currently available 
techniques. The assurance and validation of identity 
based solely on behavioural attributes or in conjunction 
with these attributes requires a nuanced approach to 
the assessment of risk. It also requires the development 
of statistical tools capable of assessing large amounts 
of low-certainty data points over long time spans to 
build a high-certainty outcome. Creating such a system 
necessitates cross sector inter-disciplinary efforts from 
social science, data science, networking, encryption, 
and computing expertise. Reflecting on our discussions 
at the workshop we have identified four key technical 
components: (i) data collection events, (ii) digital 
infrastructure, (iii) novel algorithms and (iv) security 
mechanisms. Each are explored further below.
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3.1 Data collection events
Data collection events concern any area of our life which 
can be recorded. These might typically include mobile 
phone use, engagement with social media, shopping, 
browsing, or accessing services. Hamlin (2011) provides 
one illustration of the range and diversity of digital 
interactions (see illustration).
However, as the boundaries between the digital and 
the real world become increasingly blurred we require 
ever more sophisticated taxonomies for understanding, 
coding and processing our behavioural data. An 
emerging challenge for identity systems is to harness 
this data in a manner that is scalable and can build 
technology-agnostic systems with privacy and human 
rights protection at their core. Coelition’s work in this 
area has continued to show the importance of being 
able to separate the information about an individual’s 
behaviour from the means that it was collected 
(Coelition, 2017). The OASIS COEL specification 
(OASIS, 2017) is one such framework supporting the 
collection and processing of behavioural data. Centered 
on a holistic, hierarchical taxonomy, it allows any type 
of event in our daily lives to be recorded and be uniquely 
coded to an individual (see illustration). Crucially, the 
specification pseudonymises personal data at source and 
maintains a separation between the different data types 
and clearly defined roles & responsibilities for all actors. 
All behavioural data are defined as event-based packets. 
Every packet is connected directly to an individual and 
can contain a summary of the consent they provided 
for the processing of the data (Coelition, 2017). This 
highlights the existence of mechanisms through which 
data portability can be enabled.
3.2 Digital infrastructure:
Digital infrastructure in the form of networks (i.e. fixed 
internet, GSM, 4G, Wi-Fi), storage and processing 
systems (i.e. distributed servers / cloud) are central 
to economic growth and development. However, this 
same infrastructure can significantly interfere with the 
privacy of the individuals who come to rely on it. As 
the digital economy grows new pressures are placed 
on the supporting infrastructure with key challenges 
varying depending on the contexts. In India, there has 
been a rapidly expanding growth in telecom technology 
(reportedly going from no connectivity to over 350 
million mobile Internet users in less than two decades), 
challenges include spectrum availability and costs, 
broadband infrastructure and reaching rural areas 
(Samtani and Sarawgi, 2017). In Sub-Saharan African, 
where mobile phone proliferation is amongst the highest 
in the world (Zamfir, 2015) new business models are 
addressing some key infrastructure challenges. For 
example, only 24% of the population of Sub-Saharan 
Africa has access to electricity, but rather than hamper 
access to digital technology, a number of businesses are 
tapping into the opportunity and providing solar panels 
for powering lamps and recharging phones in exchange 
for small payments over the phone (Zamfir, 2015).
In our discussions, we noted both the challenges and 
importance of public private partnerships in not only 
promoting growth and innovation but in ensuring 
standards which generate trust, protect rights and 
promote equality. These standards should overlay 
the following two principles which underpin the 
development of digital infrastructure in order to create 
the conditions for new digital identity systems:
•  Interoperable platforms: there is no single approach 
to improving identification systems. Each country, 
department, and business develops its systems 
in a way that are suited to its core aims. Having 
frameworks for interoperability across platforms 
can enable integration, scalability and cross border 
operation.
•  Open standards: facilitate interoperability and  
data exchange among different products or  
services and are intended for widespread adoption. 
Also work to provide auditability, transparency  
and data portability.
3.  Infrastructure, Science  
and Technology
Building Digital Identities June 2017 26
3.3 Novel algorithms
There is a growing body of research advancing digital 
identity provision and verification. These include 
novel algorithms which may help in cases of identity 
uncertainty, increasing privacy, data protection 
and shared signals. Examples include: probabilistic 
modelling which uses probability theory to express 
uncertainty and noise within a model; Bayesian 
inference, which permits reasoning about uncertain 
events and the incorporation of expert information, 
and machine learning. Machine learning for example 
is being used by Microsoft to help protect identity and 
produce intelligence on who might be trying to attack 
accounts (Androutsopolos et al., 2000, Microsoft, 2016).
3.4 Secure data storage and communications
The focus of this research was not to select or invent 
technical solutions, however we found it useful to 
outline some of the technologies of potential to expose 
the wider issues. One such technology is the use of 
blockchain as a verifiable open ledger. It provides a 
potential mechanism to enable an individual with 
limited access to digital technology and infrastructure 
to verify who they are, in a way that is secure and 
protects the privacy of the individual. The technology 
is an example of the types of approach that might 
specifically support the population of 1.5 billion people 
who exist without the capacity to verify who they are.
3.  Infrastructure, Science  
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The proposal follows three key principles. First of all, 
it is open, so that anyone can participate. Secondly, it 
is distributed therefore relying on multiple copies of 
the database being kept across distributed network. 
This model ensures that the system is less vulnerable 
to fraud, as the database both self-corrects and signals 
intrusion should someone seek to hack the system and 
infringe some records. The third and final principle 
is that each successive block in the chain is digitally 
signed by the owner of the previous block 
(see illustration).
An additional element of the overall system could be  
the use of SCRAM protocols (Salted Challenge 
Response Authentication Mechanism). It is commonly 
known for its use in secure chat systems (XMPP).  
It enables mutual authentication between server and 
client without plaintext password exchange or storage 
at any stage, and crucially free implementations exist.  
It thus provides a technological solution to allow  
secure upload of identity information to a blockchain. 
The system could hypothetically enable a blockchain  
of identity photos and ancillary information to be stored 
in an encrypted block, and could be verifiable from 
anywhere with internet access. The proposal raised  
a discussion about the ability of block chain technology 
to encode additional information overtime - crucial  
for use in capturing a history of behavioural evidence. 
We also noted that there was a role for ‘trusted person’, 
an individual based within the community who would 
provide additional verification that the original upload 
was genuine.
Distributed ledgers are not a universal solution. They 
are not particularly good databases for high volume data 
transactions and analytics. The technical approach 
to consensus is not fully standardised and changes  
in the underlying processes can lead to issues such  
as invalidation of existing data assets.
Other distributed technologies may also be useful (for 
example smart contracts or personal data stores) in 
the provision of data sharing, agreements, consent and 
permissions management. All these approaches will 
have their own benefits and challenges. The larger 
question will remain how can we use these technologies 
to drive digital inclusion in an interoperable and 
trustworthy manner?
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3.5 Summary
The importance of identities, particularly to the most 
vulnerable groups worldwide, should be a critical 
consideration for a digital identity system built on 
digital signatures (Mason, 2017) and life events, where 
state-of-the-art security measures should be thoroughly 
investigated in research and properly tested in  
real-world industrial systems, and thus requiring  
cross-sector multidisciplinary efforts. Specific concerns 
of security measures include database security, network 
security and physical security, which are pivoted by 
advanced encryption algorithms and network security 
protocols such as Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) and Transport Layer Security (TLS), whether 
they can provide the required stringent performance 
in a distributed and large-scale system would be an 
interesting topic worth further investigation.
Finally, it is important to note that although regulations 
are evolving away from traditional static verification, 
we are not close to a point whereby policymakers 
are confident enough to trust the performance of 
algorithmic models and codify them in regulation 
(Caribou Digital, 2016). Serious questions are being 
asked about how such algorithms are designed, what 
levels of accuracy are appropriate, and how to ensure 
transparency and accountability in automated decision-
making (Caribou Digital, 2016; Ananny, 2016; Kitchin, 
2016). There is a pressing need to provide ongoing 
intelligence to policy makers and the public about the 
potential and risks of new technologies and how they 
might help ameliorate or hinder our ability to address 
social problems.
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4. Conclusion
We set out here to explore the 
challenges, risks and opportunities of 
collecting behavioural attributes for 
new digital identity systems. However, 
we found that much of the discussion 
within the literature is framed around 
existing technologies, approaches 
and regulation rather than the specific 
challenges they we are seeking to 
address at the level of the individual.
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In exploring the role of behavioural attributes for the 
1.5 billion people who lack legal identity, we have been 
able to ask questions about the nature of ‘legal’ identity 
that are currently under-explored in the literature with 
a focus on the ethical, social, and human rights based 
aspect of identity provision. We have sought to bring 
into the discussion a need to understand who these 1.5 
billion people are, and the importance of considering 
the composite factors of vulnerability, agency, dignity 
and resilience. We feel there is a strong case for a more 
prominent focus on user engagement within the key 
policy instruments of the agenda including the ID4D 
programme, as part of an approach to developing 
digital identity systems based on societal norms and 
expectations.
Whilst we have found that it is inappropriate to 
look at the use of behavioural attributes as separate 
to traditional verifiable facts and biometrics, we 
have identified a need to place people at the heart of 
design, implementation and governance of digital 
identity systems. It is important to note that the use 
of behavioural attributes for the purposes of targeted 
marketing has played a significant role in  
the commercial success of organisations such as 
Facebook and Google, who are now looking for 
expanded growth in commercial markets and 
concurrently are playing a role within the digital 
identity arena.
We have considered both developed and developing 
settings and whilst the technical challenges are very 
similar, the priorities are different. Strong governance 
models and the wide availability of traditional 
verifiable identity attributes in developed markets leave 
behavioural attributes as a relatively low risk route to 
enhance convenience. In developing markets, the lack  
of verifiable identity attributes (such as birth 
certificates) mean that carefully collected behavioural 
attributes can have a significant impact for individuals. 
However, low levels of digital inclusion and disposable 
income alongside unproven business models may be 
hampering innovation in this space at present. In the 
context of weak state-level identity systems, poor 
governance and infrastructure, there is an urgent need 
for frameworks and regulation to ensure that identity 
systems are robust and built ethically, safeguarding 
privacy, dignity, autonomy, and agency.
Fears about the low-governance roll out of commercial 
services in developing markets spring from their  
well-recognised ability to drive change from the 
demand-led paradigm. The attitude to commercial  
risk in the private sector provides opportunities  
as well as risks - durable partnerships will help to 
control and harness this drive.
We have found that technology itself is playing a role in 
enabling the changes that are being sought. Distributed 
servers and the GSM network may place sections of 
the 1.5Bn within reach of a digital future. Questions 
remain not just around digital inclusion, but also around 
who will control the information and the algorithms, 
alongside who we should trust to have this control and 
to what means it might be used.
Finally, we have found that the role of behavioural 
attributes in digital identity systems is vastly 
unexplored in both policy and development practice 
although used to some extent within private enterprise. 
With our current trajectory with regards to digital 
technology and its integration with society, how these 
developments are shaping how we act, how we think and 
what we can do, it is evident that these attributes will 
play an increasingly significant role in both developed 
and developing settings. It is essential that identity 
related policy keeps a pace with these developments, in 
order to enable innovation that is responsible, ethical 
and can enhance the freedoms of the 1.5 billion people 
who do not have access to legal identity.
4. Conclusion
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5.  Priorities for 
research  
and action
Following our discussions at  
the workshop and subsequent 
desk based research we have 
identified a number of key  
areas for further research:
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Person-centred design
•  How can we enable individuals to be involved in the 
design, implementation and governance of digital 
identity systems?
•  How are publics informed about identity systems  
and what agency do they have in the design and  
use of such systems?
•  What are the incentives for adopting identity  
systems (i.e. the push and the pull) and how are  
these incentives built into the system?
•  What innovative communication/education 
techniques are used to reach and encourage uptake  
in hard-to-reach communities?
•  What are the various touch-points where individuals 
may be excluded from a digital system?
•  What innovative research methods have been used 
to identify and articulate these touch-points, in 
particular with marginalised communities (i.e. 
bottom of the pyramid, women in rural areas, 
refugees and migrants)?
•  How have agencies responded with innovation  
in design?
Legal and regulatory frameworks
•  What are the key legal frameworks and how do  
these intersect with identity systems and provision?
•  How do legal norms and institutions that regulate 
procedures and processes, differ across countries and 
regions and what are their impact on implementation?
•  How can we develop international standards, norms 
and agreements for person-centric identity provision 
on a global scale?
•  What is the role of international actors in 
encouraging regulation and norms at a country level?
•  How will legal responsibilities and liabilities be 
negotiated in complex systems with many providers, 
devices, algorithms and users?
Public, private and person partnerships
•  What are the relationships between the personal 
interests, the commercial interests and the state’s 
interest in the control of data and identity?
•  What is the role of regulation within these 
partnerships? What are the regulatory frameworks 
required to enable innovation but protect human 
rights of individuals?
•  How to identify and manage the many disparities  
of power and influence between the individual and 
the state or commercial organisation?
•  What are the business models that might drive 
innovation?
•  What values do corporate organisations use,  
and to what extent are they in keeping with 
development provision? Can those values sustain 
themselves overtime?
•  How can different attitudes to risk be 
understood and integrated into the 
development of digital identity systems?
5.  Priorities for research  
and action
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Social and ethical considerations
•  What are the normative societal expectations  
around legal identity and digital identity systems?
•  How do systems impact agency, resilience, 
vulnerability and trust?
•  Who are the 1.5 billion people without legal identity? 
What are the different groups that exist (i.e. refugees, 
migrants, rural communities) and how do we design 
systems for and with them? In what ways do identity 
systems enhance or restrict their freedoms?
•  What are the different attitudes to privacy for 
different groups and how might these attitudes 
shape policy and behaviour? To what extent are 
new schemes needed to raise digital literacy and 
awareness of rights around privacy, access etc.?
Technology and innovation
•  What are the innovation pathways for digital  
identity systems based on behavioural attributes?
•  What is the likely road-map for digital infrastructure 
across different countries and regions?
•  Which technologies are best placed to operate  
in this landscape?
•  What are the limitations of the technologies  
and how could any restrictions be mitigated?
•  What is the role of academic research and  
how can design knowledge be transferred?
•  How can proof of concept experiments for behaviour 
based identity systems be run, both as augmentations 
of existing systems and as stand-alone systems?
5.  Priorities for research  
and action
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